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Resumen: Este artículo propone una 
lectura del conflicto armado a partir de 
un diseño evolutivo que tenga en cuenta el 
concepto de agencias de protección privada 
en las obras de Schelling / Nozick / Gam-
betta. Su objetivo es evaluar la dinámica del 
conflicto y los cambios de la producción 
científica de los autores. El contexto de los 
conflictos, que incluye, nuevas expresiones 
de la violencia y el relativo fracaso de la 
reinserción paramilitar implica usar nuevos 
modelos de análisis (la argumentación, la 
teoría de juegos y la información inconsis-
tente). La evolución reciente de las bandas 
emergentes y su expansión a zonas que 
eran campamentos  paramilitares requiere 
el seguimiento no sólo del gobierno y 
las autoridades, sino la investigación del 
conflicto en la actualidad. El autor ofrece 
soporte a la investigación heurística de la 
teoría estratégica de Schelling, las agencias 
y la protección de Nozick y las recientes 
contribuciones de Gambetta a la relación 
entre el crimen organizado y los carteles 
de la droga.
Palabras clave: Guerra civil, Colombia, 
conflicto armado, teoría estratégica, Gam-
betta, Nozick, Schelling.
Abstract: This article proposes a reading 
of  the armed conflict from an evolutionary 
design that takes into account the concept 
of  private protection agencies in the works 
of  Schelling / Nozick / Gambetta. Their 
aim is to assess the dynamics of  conflict and 
changes from its author’s scientific output. 
A context of  conflicts that includes new 
expressions of  violence and the relative 
failure of  the paramilitary reintegration 
involves using new analytical models (ar-
gumentation, game theory and inconsistent 
information). The recent evolution of  
emerging gangs and their expansion into 
areas that were paramilitary camps requires 
monitoring not only of  the government 
and the authorities, but those investigat-
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1 José Obdulio Gaviria, Sofismas del terrorismo en Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Planeta, 2005; Posada 
Carbó, Eduardo, La nación soñada, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2006, pp. 388; even though less dog-
matic than the former in his public position though less dogmatic, the reports and columns of  the 
jouranlist, Alfredo Rangel, have echoed in the Uribe government: “Long Live Plan Colombia” (Semana, 
21/03/2009); “Alan Jara’s absentmindedness” (Semana, 21/02/2009); “What did the FARC last agree 
on?” (Semana, 16/03/2008. Rangel has had a reactionary tendency over the last decade and has de-
fended economic sectors that have recieved benefits under the Uribe government.
Introduction 
The Colombian armed conflict has evolved 
over the last decade. However, this evolu-
tion has not necessarily been reflected in 
the analyses of  some researchers who 
have heavily influenced public opinion. 
The following hypotheses are the most 
relevant for the questions that will be raised 
in this article:
1. Neither an armed conflict nor a civil 
war exist in Colombia: the para-state 
groups have disarmed, and the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia 
(hereafter referred to as the FARC) 
and the National Liberation Army 
(hereafter referred to as the ELN) are 
being defeated (official version upheld 
by the Uribe government according to 
José Obdulio Gaviria, Posada Carbó 
and Alfredo Rangel1). 
ing the conflict in the present tense. The 
author provides heuristic research sup-
port from Schelling’s theory of  strategy, 
Nozick’s agencies and the protection, 
and Gambetta’s recent contributions to 
the relationship between organized crime 
and drug cartels.
Key words: Civil War, Colombia, armed 
conflict, drug trafficking, organized crime, 
paramilitary counterinsurgency war, Game 
Theory and inconsistent information.
Résumé : Cet article propose une lecture 
du conflit armé en Colombie à partir d'une 
conception évolutive qui prend en compte 
le concept d'agences de protection privées 
dans les travaux de Schelling / Nozick / 
Gambetta, dont leur objectif  est d'évaluer la 
dynamique des conflits et des changements. 
Dans unconflit qui inclut de nouvelles ex-
pressions de violence et l'échec relatif  de la 
réinsertion des paramilitairesdans la société 
civile, il faut utiliser des nouveaux modèles 
analytiques (argumentation, théorie des 
jeux et des informations incohérentes). 
L'évolution récente de gangs émergents et 
leur expansion dans des zones qui étaient 
des camps paramilitaires, a besoin de la 
surveillance non seulement de la part du 
gouvernement et des autorités, mais égale-
ment de la part de ceux qui enquêtent sur 
le conflit. L'auteur fournit un soutien à la 
recherche heuristique de la théorie de la 
stratégieproposée par Schelling, de la théo-
rie des agences et la protection proposée 
par Nozicket des récentes contributions 
de Gambetta concernant la relation entre 
le crime organisé et les cartels de drogue.
Most clef  : Guerre civile, la Colombie, 
conflit armé, trafic de stupéfiant, crime 
organicé, théorie des jeux et asymétrie 
d'information. 
Clasificación JEL: D23, D82, D74.
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2. Due to their causal relationship, vio-
lence and the conflict in general have 
evolved in a uniform manner.  As such, 
present examples of  both can be ex-
plained using similar methods (Daniel 
Pecaut)2. 
3. Colombian violence manifested in 
diverse modalities (such as homicides, 
crime and massacres) is derived from 
the armed conflict; and vice versa, the 
armed conflict has caused chains of  civil 
violence and state anomie (Waldmann)3. 
4. In the end, the strategies employed by 
the guerrillas and the paramilitaries 
have become analogous with regards 
to both their objectives and their pro-
cedures. An extended learning curb 
has demonstrated that their differences 
are minimal (Fernando Cubides, León 
Valencia)4. Premise: Hypotheses to be 
2 Daniel Pecaut argues for this hypothesis in his famous article, The past, present and future of the violence: 
“The violence has become a functional mode of  society, given the birth of  diverse networks that exert 
influence over the population and of  official regulations. It is better not to analyse the violence as a 
provional reality. This all suggests that a durable situation has been created, Revista Análisis Político, 
30, 1997, IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
3 Peter Waldmann, Guerra civil, terrorismo y anomia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2007, pp. 304. Waldmann’s 
position reflects a varient interpretation supported by analists whose sources are limited to opinion.  This 
does not constitute an extensive critic of  Waldmann’s work in general, but the observations concerning 
Colombia are seen as forced so as to support his hypothesis. The magazine, Revista Análisis Político, 
has also published the article The habilitualization of  violence in Colombia 32, sep/dec. 1997.
4 Fernando Cubides has reviewed the fundamental differences in strategy employed by the paramilitaries 
and the insurgents, and in particular he has focused on the use of  intimidation and mutual learning, 
please see: Burocracias armadas, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, p. 200; also please see León Valencia’s re-
port: Parapolítica, la ruta de la expansión paramilitar y los acuerdos políticos, Bogotá, Corporación 
Nuevo Arco Iris, 2007, p. 396.
5 Duncan, Gustavo, Los señores de la guerra: de paramilitares, mafiosos y autodefensas en Colombia, 
Bogotá, Planeta, 2006. In 1991 Álvaro Camacho Guisado stated: “the drugs industry, without a doubt 
the newest phenomonen and that which characterizes most adequately contemporary violence, a situa-
tion that is considerably complex, can already explain all the threads of  the conflict”, Bogotá, Análisis 
Político, No. 12, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia. 
  
questioned concerning the armed con-
flict: no armed conflict, violence and 
armed conflict are uniform, violence is 
derived from armed conflict, guerrillas 
and paras the same, 
5. The driving force behind the functio-
nality of  the para-state groups and their 
persistence over the last two decades 
has been the drugs industry. The drugs 
economy and other related businesses 
are fundamental factors in the Colom-
bian armed conflict (Duncan, Camacho 
Guisado)5. 
Each hypothesis expresses a predominant 
analytic focus on the strategic evolution 
of  the armed conflict. It must be empha-
sised that this analytic classification is not 
meant to impose a complete taxonomy 
and, even less, does it intend to accredit 
the analysts with rigid positions. However, 
The logic of the violence in the civil war...
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it is contended that to a great extent the 
classification does reflect both academic 
publications and media sources that gener-
ate public opinion. Those who believe that 
Colombia has consolidated a constitutional 
democracy with full guarantees to security 
and a reduction in violence during the 
Uribe government (1) will also share the 
hypothesis that the violent out lashes are 
nothing more than revenge and retaliations 
between the cartels (5). The analysts that 
have explained the conflict through social 
science categories (3) are found to have 
similar conclusions to those who observe 
regularities or small differences in the 
conflict over a large period of  time (2). 
Lastly, those that identify and use economic 
variables to explain the conflict will uphold 
that there is little difference between the 
strategies and the military operatives of  
the violent actors (4) – (5). Whilst voicing 
their support for the Uribe government, 
the analysts can uphold hypotheses (1) – 
(4) – (5); or alternatively, they can deny the 
hypotheses (2) – (3). 
It is obvious that with the evolution of  
the armed conflict the analysts could of-
fer less superficial hypotheses than those 
articulated above. The armed conflict and 
displays of  violence in Colombia are both 
variant and continuous in kind.  Since the 
eighties, the drugs industry has influenced 
the illegal trade market including arms, 
smuggling and drugs; but how has this 
interfered with fundamental sectors of  the 
legal market, such as real estate, tourism, 
transport, and less obviously with poultry 
sector? How does communication operate 
between organized crime, kidnapping, the 
guerrillas and the paramilitaries? To what 
extent has the conflict transformed living 
conditions in urban and rural Colombia? 
Unfortunately, these are questions that have 
failed to be addressed in the conventional 
interpretations of  violence perpetuated 
after the 60s. 
I. The hypotesis 
In order to complement previous studies, 
the present article aims to balance on the 
one the one hand substantiated arguments, 
and on the other, the strategic evolution 
of  the conflict. Taking into account limita-
tions, the reach of  the article is confined 
to addressing problems that have been 
confronted within the last decade (argu-
mentation, strategies developed within a 
civil war and asymmetric information). As 
such, the objective is to present an analysis 
of  the conflict and its recent evolution in 
the context of  private security actors.  It 
is contended that the evolutionary state of  
the conflict offers unprecedented aspects 
with respect to the violence perpetrated in 
the 60s and the war fought between the 
drugs cartels during the 80s6. Contrary to 
6 A study addressing such changes should identify the profound geo-political and territorial transfor-
mations that have provoked the armed conflict.  The maps that are in use serve to limit localising the 
positions of  the para-state groups, dwarfing greater analytic developments concerning their strategies. 
The geographic dynamic should take into account, for example, local and regional strategies. A syste-
matic comparative study of  the last half  century could demonstrate continuities and identity changes 
of  the principal agents. Please see the attempted studies by Reyes, Alejandro (2009); Echandía (2006); 
Deas, 1999); Pecaut (2008).     
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hypothesis (1), it is argued that the rein-
sertion of  paramilitary forces as part of  a 
Democratic Security policy has not given 
definitive results7. The guerrilla groups 
have as yet not been defeated and the rein-
serted paramilitaries have merely returned 
to their organisations (in contradiction to 
hypotheses (1) and (4)). The geographic 
makeup of  the armed conflict shows dy-
namics of  territorial competition between 
paramilitary groups and insurgents acting 
in coalition with drugs cartels [hypothesis 
(5)]. As a result, the evolution of  the armed 
conflict has provided fertile ground for 
a private security and protection market, 
further demanded by a geographical and 
territorial transformation8.
Let us sustain that the questions relating 
to the continuation and evolution of  the 
conflict over the last decade are to some 
extent different to those relating to its 
original causes and embryonic evolution 
addressed by the principal actors (contrary 
to hypothesis (2)). Taken from this perspec-
tive, the various organisations have behaved 
and continue to behave according to their 
own rationale. However, some analysts 
feel comfortable with characterising the 
paramilitaries, insurgents and criminal 
gangs as equivalent. This tautology does 
not have explanatory force.  In Colombia 
7 While writing this article President Uribe and his government offerred recompensation for information 
concerning 10 ringleaders who are in charge of  10.000 paramilitaries. The expansion of  the emerging 
(paramilitary) groups and their armed mobilisation in that territory speaks against the proclaimed end 
of  the war in Colombia. See: “Captura de capos de bandas emergentes tendrá la misma prioridad que 
la de máximos jefes guerrilleros”, El Tiempo, 10th March 2009.
8 The paramilitary and insurgent activity has been especially concentrated in Nariño, Cauca, Meta, 
(towards the Southern); Córdoba, Sucre and la Guajira, (in the Northern regions en las regiones). Please 
see: “Se crece el enano: la expansión de las Águilas Negras” Revista Semana, 05/31/2008.  
the actors violate common expectations of  
normal conduct, to an implausible degree. 
An aspect that has received little atten-
tion in conventional literature is that the 
majority of  those integrated in the para-
state groups tend to violate a basic general 
principal: namely, preservation of  one’s 
own life. This applies to a lesser degree 
to insurgents, and even less to members 
of  criminal organisations. This violation 
becomes more worrying in as much as 
the para-state organisations seem to break 
the dictates of  instrumental rationality: 
the actors should preserve their integrity 
when there is a great risk posed against 
their life. A correlation between unemploy-
ment and illiteracy and an early intake into 
the criminal networks weave threads into 
the tapestry of  the conflict and present 
complications for any analysis (contrary 
to hypothesis (5)).  
In the explanatory framework of  the 
violence perpetrated in Colombia, ge-
ography has assumed a secondary role. 
Research undertaken over the last decade 
has constructed conflict maps that only 
partially represent the changes that have 
taken place regarding para-state territorial 
presence. The map still does not differenti-
ate between the unprecedented strategies 
advanced by the organisations, nor does 
The logic of the violence in the civil war...
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it reveal the territorial confrontations 
between such groups. Further questions 
need to be addressed: How can the ge-
ography of  the violence help to explain 
the struggle between insurgents and 
paramilitaries to control the dominant 
smuggling areas? Likewise, how can intra-
group incentives explain the distribution 
and negotiation of  territories, drugs and 
arms in border zone?
These questions expose the need to intro-
duce a geographic dimension to conflict 
analysis. The conflict maps should ad-
dress group structure and gauge possible 
changes. Indeed, paramilitary mobility 
seems to correspond to different factors 
to that of  the anti-insurgent movement 
advanced by the public forces and with the 
support of  Carlos Castaño and Salvatore 
Mancuso.  Significantly, the war of  territo-
rial control does not seek to displace the 
ideological enemy, but to compete in the 
drugs market (hypothesis (5)).  Additionally, 
a geographical map of  the conflict ahould 
addresses the changing political dynamics 
within principal and secondary cities. A 
model outlining territorial competition 
strategies between para-state groups and 
conflicts within the organisations is at-
tached in the annex. 
II.  What does strategic evolution 
mean? 
According to Schelling9, conflict theories 
can be classified into those that see the 
conflict as a pathological state and study 
its’ causes and treatment, and those that 
accept the conflict as a fact and analyse the 
behaviour which arises out of  it.  This last 
category is then divided into those theories 
that comprehensively analyse, in its full 
complexity, all those that participate in a 
conflict (rational and irrational conduct, 
caculi and motivations), and those theories 
that consider the actors that act rationally in 
a conflict (competition, generalised benefi-
cial end and means of  achieving this end).
The latter category is known as conflict 
strategy.  This article will explore Schelling’s 
notion of  conflict strategy with relation to 
the Colombian conflict for three reasons: 
a) as analysts ourselves, we are taking a 
position in the conflict; therefore, we 
want to know for what reasons the actors 
rationally perpetrate violence; b) we have 
an interest in understanding what types 
of  changes and phenomena the principal 
actors experience; c) it is possible that we 
have a certain degree of  influence (direct 
and indirect) over the behaviour and the 
social representations that spring from the 
conflict, and for that reason, it is important 
to understand the variables which restrict 
possible action.
9  Like few authors, Thomas C. Shelling (1960) has managed to propose an original strategy theory that, 
due to its simplicity, has overcome the complex formulation of  the conventional game theory (New-
man/Nash). Recently Schelling has highlighted the historical and geographical circumstances which led 
to the formation of  his model, please see: Jean-Paul Carvalh, “An interview with Thomas Schelling”, 
Oxonomics 2 (2007) 1-8. The graphic diagram that we use is also valid (with small differences) according 
to Nozick, 1974 and Gambetta, 1993.
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Rational conduct is the fundamental factor 
to be considered in this article.  Indeed, 
Schelling’s diagram suggests that conflict 
strategy can be understood by analysing 
various characteristics of  rational behav-
iour: the micro behaviour of  an individual, 
the miso behaviour of  a soldier within 
an armed group or macro behaviour of  
the armed group in general.  Individuals 
actions’ are motivated by incentives that 
can be quantified, ranging from basic sal-
ary, bonuses and awards for successful 
operations, to goods collected for threat, 
extortion and blackmail. These explanatory 
elements can by used to construct a coher-
ent account of  the rationality for joining 
one of  the armed forces (as observed the 
individual’s motivation may not be violent). 
In any case, motivation to act is not con-
sidered in moral terms when analysing the 
complex structure of  rationality. 
Limiting conflict studies to strategy theory 
reduces the understanding of  field of  ac-
tion solely to rational conduct (as opposed 
to irrational conduct motivated by passion); 
which is to say, not only to intelligent 
conduct, but also to conduct motivated 
by a utilitarian calculation of  advantages 
and inconveniences. Within an armed 
group this is based on a coherent system 
of  values, such as obedience, the benefits 
of  lying, punishment, incentives etc. This 
limited perspective has its advantages: it 
allows for the development of  a theory of  
conflict strategy based on rational choice. 
Assuming the existence of  the conflict and 
contending that each armed actor has to 
“win” does not necessarily imply that the 
actors´ interests are in opposition. Only in 
a theoretic case of  a pure conflict are the 
interests of  the antagonists in complete op-
position and the goal is total extermination 
of  the adversary.  However, coalitions of  
otherwise enemy armed forces may form to 
access economic resources, control drugs 
production and the main transportation 
routes, protect the population to gain local 
support, negotiate, etc. As such, compet-
ing actors have a common interest. This 
is especially the case in Colombia where 
there are a plethora of  armed groups 
competing in a diverse geographic land-
scape. Therefore, a gain in the language 
of  a conflict does not necessarily translate 
into gains with respect to the adversary, 
but gains with respect to one of  the sys-
tems of  values (micro, miso and macro). 
Within the context of  a conflict, there must 
always the possibility of  a solution. The 
possibility of  a solution and the common 
interests between the various armed fac-
tions creates a mutual inter-dependence. 
This mutual inter-dependence allows for a 
diverse range of  tactics, such as intimida-
tion, threat, disarmament and negotiation, 
which continually change the dynamics of  
the conflict, specific to time and territory. 
The mutual inter-dependence has a psycho-
logical element. In one region some armed 
factions may be friends, in another they 
may be foes, but in either case the various 
groups will never have comprehensive 
information concerning the others.  For 
example, they will not know the quantity 
and quality of  their arms, their territorial 
control, their resources or the size of  their 
cultivations.  Much of  the information that 
they do receive is based on rumour. The 
asymmetric and incomplete information 
provides breeding ground for psychologi-
cal warfare.  Strategy does not have to refer 
The logic of the violence in the civil war...
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to the use of  force, but to what Schelling 
denominates: “the exploitation of  potential 
force”. Due to the lack of  information 
concerning the other armed groups, a 
threatened group to some extent can only 
hazard a guess at whether a threat can ac-
tually be followed through.  This strategy 
affects both the enemy and those who 
form part of  the alliance because the aim 
of  the strategy is to deliver a solution that is 
mutually beneficial for all the participants, 
whether that be negatively avoiding harm 
or positively gaining a benefit. 
In terms of  the game theory, the most 
interesting conflicts are not those which 
add up to zero, for example in the Cold 
War where the enemy forces knew that 
they had equal and opposite power in the 
form of  nuclear weapons which resulted 
in a strategic tie, but those in which the 
competing factions have asymmetric and 
incomplete information concerning the 
other, and in which one side does not have 
to win, but both groups can simultaneously 
gain from a conflict through their common 
interests. In this study, the exploitation of  
potential force is understood to compare 
how strategies are developed within an 
organisation (rationality, inter-dependence, 
friend-enemy, means of  achieving an end) 
and how competitive strategies (threat, 
intimidation, extortion, fines and taxes) 
between different groups are developed, 
in key territories.
Threatening the opposition is an impor-
tant strategy. The use and style of  threats 
has been developed in such a way that it 
now delivers profitable results.  Time has 
taught that for a threat to be successful 
then it must be believable, and its credibility 
depends on the implied risks and actions 
to be complied with by the threatening 
party. As such, the efficiency of  the threat 
depends on the rationale of  the adversary. 
For example, the threat of  mass destruc-
tion can only intimidate an enemy if  first, 
that enemy believes that those threatening 
them have the capacity to mass destruct, 
and second, that there equally exists a 
possibility not to destruct. In the case of  
Colombia, the threatening party must be 
able to take preventative measures to stop 
the confrontations from escalating. Agree-
ments between the government and the 
paramilitaries have intended to limit the 
capacity of  the FARC and the ELN to 
threat and extort10. 
The process through which the idea of  
conflict strategy has been developed has 
been considerable slow. The existent theory 
is very vague and there is little literature 
that applies the theory to the case study 
of  Colombia. Methodology has not been 
developed concerning the use of  threat and 
the related literature does not provide pos-
sible solutions to the immediate problems. 
Why has there been a lack of  theoretical 
development? The answer lies in the fact 
10 We presented a preliminary paper concerning the roll of  indirect communications in typical cases of  
threat and bribery to the First Congress of  Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, No-
viembre de 2008, (Estrada Gallego, Fernando, El Soborno y la Amenaza en las Guerras Civiles, La 
Universidad del Valle, Departamento de Economia, Cali, Colombia, 2008).
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that the military services, in contrast to 
almost all other important professions, lack 
an identifiable academic counterpart.  Both 
the military and the interest groups fail to 
recognise the relevance of  the problem. 
What would a theory concerning conflict 
strategy in Colombia address?  Which ques-
tions would it try to answer? Which ideas 
would it try to group together, clarify or 
communicate in a more effective manner? 
To start with, it would have to identify the 
key elements of  the conflict and create a 
typology of  the various conducts employed 
by the armed parties (for example the 
government and the para-state groups). 
The objective of  strategy is to influence 
the actions of  an adversary and to induce 
a desired behaviour, but what system of  
values provides for the credibility of  a 
threat?  All of  these questions demonstrate 
that there is sufficient material to create 
a theory that would help to give greater 
understanding of  the Colombian conflict. 
This paper will try to answer these ques-
tions and will integrate various perspectives 
into the analysis, such as the game theory, 
inconsistent information, argument analy-
sis and collective decision-making. 
According to the Conventional Game 
Theory, violence perpetrated in an armed 
conflict is rationally or irrationally moti-
vated. Some orthodox writers believe it is 
exclusively one or the other. However, it 
is dogmatic to sustain that violence is only 
rationally motivated because there is no 
optimal level of  rationality used for apply-
ing violence. Likewise, violence cannot only 
be motivated by passion because enemies 
will rationalise the best means of  achieving 
benefits, such as drugs production, and 
this may involve an alliance with otherwise 
enemy forces. Lets say for example that 
soldier A is threatening the family of  an 
enemy soldier B.  B may pay soldier A not 
to harm his family out of  fear, which is a 
passion, or because he rationally deduces 
that A always follows through with his 
threats. A more nuanced understanding 
of  strategy contends that violence is both 
rationally and irrationally motivated, that 
which Schelling names an inter-dependent 
decision theory. There is psychological 
dependence between the various groups, 
and their actions towards each other are 
both rational and irrational. For example, 
the para-state groups use dates and facts, 
information and estimations concerning 
the enemy to strategise and the govern-
ment uses expected behavioural patterns 
attributed to insurgents, paramilitaries and 
organized criminals. 
The assumption that, during a conflict, 
strategic decisions are made using a rational 
framework, implicitly affirms a rational 
utilitarian theory of  action. Many of  the 
critical elements than are integrated into 
the model of  rational conduct can be typi-
fied as rational or irrational. This premise 
obliges us to consider what irrationality 
means. Irrationality is defined as an inco-
herent and disordered system of  values that 
may lead to miscalculations. Information 
systems, collective decision-making or the 
parameters by which the possibility of  er-
ror is represented or loss of  control can 
be considered as an intent to formalize the 
study of  irrationality. 
The apparent limitations that are imposed 
by starting from this premise of  rationality 
are revealed by two observations: (a) an 
The logic of the violence in the civil war...
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otherwise unstable or irrational enemy can 
often be intuitively understood as strategic; 
and (b) an explicit theory that considers 
rational decision-making and its strategic 
consequences unequivocally demonstrates 
that acting rationally does not necessarily 
constitute a universal advantage in conflict 
situations. Many of  the factors of  ratio-
nality suppose adverse factors in certain 
strategic situations, that is to say, it can be 
rational not to be rational. Additionally, 
there are defences that in strategy theory 
could be seen as deteriorations of  rational-
ity. This also demonstrates that in the face 
of  a threat, it is not always advantageous to 
have an efficient system of  communication, 
to have complete information regarding the 
adversary or to find oneself  in the position 
of  power to provide all and freely from 
one’s own goods.
To resume, the focus taken in this article 
that addresses conflict strategy is an analytic 
extension of  Thomas C. Schelling’s work 
(1960).  The strategy theory is conceived 
in relation to mutual inter-dependence. In 
a conflict, the behaviour of  soldiers that 
compete for control of  zones and territo-
ries with economic benefits is regarded as 
sufficiently rational (Collier/Skaperdas). 
In this article, the strategy is related to 
incentives and motivations: money, salaries, 
drugs, arms, women etc. The geography 
of  the country reduces local populations 
to military or political objectives by the 
principal agents of  the conflict.  Also the 
strategy follows patterns of  logic in terms 
of  communication and violent discourse. 
Information exchanged during a war, 
including the use of  arms, the communi-
cation of  motives given for an attack or a 
defence, is significantly strategic (Lakoff). 
III.  Where are we now?
Why do in some regions in Colombia seem 
to have such a persistent incapacity for eco-
nomic and social growth? Collective action 
and growth have been severely stunted by 
the Colombian conflict in which violence is 
the primary instrument. Over time, broader 
factors have also come into play.  Regions 
that lie in the centre of  the country, for 
example cities such as Bogotá and Medel-
lín, have been significantly developed, of-
fer broad employment opportunities and 
are relatively superior to regions situated 
in the peripheries of  Colombia, such as 
Bojayá and Leticia11. The geography of  
disproportionate economic development 
corresponds to historical and social devia-
tions, the importance of  which has been 
vastly overlooked (Lora/Gaviria, 2005)12. 
In part, these conditions can be explained 
by the evolution of  institutionalisation and 
the Colombian state, and additionally by 
problems in the structure of  collective 
action and beliefs (North, 2007). Some 
critics have also diagnosed the problem 
as a lack of  confidence. These precarious 
factors negatively affect the possibility to 
11 The categories of  centre/periphery are used to historically describe disequal socal relations in the regions 
that have been researched by Roldán Mary, A sangre y fuego. La violencia en Antioquia, 1946-1953, 
Bogotá, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, Banco de la Republica, 2003, 435 pp.
12 Lora’s/Gaviria’s controversial hypotheses have been the object of  Estrada’s anaylisis (2007b).   
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achieve a better quality of  life in these zones 
that have been beaten down by the armed 
conflict. As has been recently noted, the 
lack of  a capital within which the citizens 
can have confidence, has brought perverse 
effects to the whole Colombian society 
(Gaviria 2005)13.
However, another focus area that has been 
of  progressive interest for many analysts 
is related with the reverse of  the previous 
questions: How is it possible that citizens 
achieve productive activity in spite of  the 
social order? Which aspects condition or 
restrain the debilitation of  social order? 
These questions change the way that 
conflict studies addresses information 
that circulates in the form of  propaganda, 
the news and public opinion. For many 
analysts, Colombia represents a laboratory 
of  investigation: contrasting markets, an 
entrepreneurial society, and indicators of  
13 The contrast between these social relations has been exasperated by distrust in the principal confron-
tation zones and geographical areas where drugs are produced and trafficked. The distrust frequently 
threatens minimal existent relationships due to manipulation of  information by those who exercise 
military control in these territories. It is important to emphasise that mistrust in Colombia varies over 
time and space. Those who arrive in Cartegena for tourism and who never leave the departmental 
capitals have no comprehension of  distrust in the other regions.
14  “Latin America, a happy region”, El Tiempo, 15/11/2008. “I am happy, we are from the third world”, 
El Tiempo, 4/06/2008.
15 Truly unusual of  cases like that which occurred in the municipal of  Pelaya located in the south of  Cesar: 
since September of  the previous year, the self-defence units have prohibited the posting of  philosophy 
and social science teachers in all schools. A teacher, who had to flee from the zone, explained that the 
order was given without more details and that he had to question it, “Even Plato left running”. “Hasta 
Platón lo sacaron corriendo”. El Tiempo, 4/22/2001. Articles written by Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, 
“Ciénaga Grande viaje al corazón de la barbarie”,  Magazine NUMERO, v. 28, pp.70-73 , 2001; “Dilemas 
de la guerra y la política”, Newspaper Cátedra Libre, Universidad Industrial de Santander, 2001; “El 
desplazamiento forzado en Colombia”, Magazin Dominical, Vanguardia Liberal, Bucaramanga, 2001-09-
07; “Peque, ataque guerrillero a la población civil”, Analítica, Venezuela, 2001-06-10; “Viaje al corazón 
de la barbarie”, Jornada Semanal, Ciudad de México, 2001-02-11; “La retórica del paramilitarismo”, The 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia newspaper,  2001-12-15; “Argumentos sobre el conflicto”, Magazín 
de Vanguardia Liberal, Bucaramanga, 2001/04/17.
optimum levels of  happiness in all the 
regions14.   
It was during the 80’s, more so than previ-
ous decades that the para-state groups (in-
surgents, self-defence groups and criminal 
organisations) began to offer a lucrative ser-
vice: private protection. Given the vacuum 
left by the State and the mistrust of  key 
organisations in economic development, 
these groups undertook illegal activities 
in various regions of  the country. To start 
with they offered subtle mechanisms of  
protection at a low cost and afterwards 
they used intimidation. The paramilitar-
ies and insurgents managed to integrate 
into local political life and in some cases 
their intervention exceeded basic social 
relations, intervening in, with or without 
authority, the resolution of  disputes and 
quarrels fought amongst members of  the 
communities15.
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The protection agencies caused deci-
sive profound changes in the territorial 
geography of  the country that affected 
regional governability.  As they ampli-
fied the number of  their fronts in zones 
such as Magdelena Medio and Puerto 
Boyacá, they also expanded their radius 
of  political influence in the Pacific Coast, 
the Guajira and up to the reaches of  the 
south of  the country in depeartments such 
as Cauca and Nariño.  In certain towns, 
the policies undertaken by the para-state 
groups served to reduce the incident of  
common delinquency (Deas, 1999). Also, 
they planned a redistribution of  contracts 
designed to develop public work, but the 
plan was never followed through with. 
These are examples that show that the 
para-state groups undermined the state 
whenever they deemed necessary.  The 
vigilence that they provided gave relative 
calm to the citizens, also forms of  social 
and political contract in the shadow of  
the state16.
This extensive global mechanism of  
extortion greatly exemplifies parasite 
forms of  social contract. The self-defence 
forces intervened in local power, saving 
the appearances of  a reality that reduced 
governability for three consecutive gov-
ernments: Gaviria, Samper and Pastrana. 
The long-term effects have been devastat-
ing. The para-state groups used random 
16 Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “Guerra civil y contractualismo político incompleto”, Revista Analítica 
Premium, Caracas, Venezuela,  04/09/2008; García, Villegas, Mauricio et al., Jueces sin Estado, Fun dación 
Konrad Adenauer y The John Merck Foundation, Bogotá, 2008. This book collected testimonies and 
cases which demonstrate of  the exercise of  justice in zone dominated by para-state groups. It recognizes 
how the groups took over the State through providing a findamental pillarstone of  government: justice. 
methodology to manage high cost busi-
ness transactions across various sectors 
and exponentially raised general mistrust. 
The alliances and coalitions between 
self-defence forces and the drugs cartels 
or between insurgents and landowners 
spoilt legitimate constitutional order and 
legitimate power in various regions, capital 
cities and intermediate towns.  
An accumulation of  necessities caused 
by unemployment or a low income in 
certain municipals create an abundance of  
potential human resources to be recruited 
into the para-state groups. These groups 
manage to recruit indolence and youth, 
whose age oscillates between 13 and 20 
years old, into their fronts. By providing 
the local population with incentives aiming 
at satisfying their basic necessities, the self-
defence forces and the insurgents were able 
to get a stronghold in strategic territories 
where they were then able to reek fear 
and control the illegal markets. Within the 
localities, illegal mechanisms were adopted 
to resolve domestic disputes. Those who 
were favoured by the commanders were 
assured power for illegal business deals and 
transactions within and outside of  their 
zones. This new order managed to work 
perfectly thanks to indulgent government 
employees and entities who soiled their 
hands in para-state activities, or merely 
acted dumb.  
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The influence that these agencies have 
had on collective Colombian life has been 
negative. The local mafias, self-defence 
forces, insurgents and paramilitaries have 
affected regional territorial structure and 
conditioned new cultural standards. The 
incentives and belief  that wellbeing consists 
in material goods, together with an inver-
sion of  community values, profoundly 
undermined the affirmative conventions 
of  work, education and collective re-
sponsibility. Progressive weakening public 
confidence was caused by political agree-
ments which assured the functioning of  the 
private security agencies and para-political 
intervention in government. A panorama 
of  this magnitude was obviously going to 
structurally affect the institutions. 
The territorial configuration of  the pro-
tection agencies has left concomitant 
consequences. Perhaps the most alarming 
is the distrust that Colombian society has 
of  the state and the coalitions that formed 
between the elite, organised crime and para-
state groups. A broad look at the structure 
of  the private protection agencies reveals 
new organisational modalities and perverse 
mechanism of  contract.  This image below 
shows new illegal groups and patterns of  
shared learning (Cubides, 2005). Addi-
tionally, the continual sequence of  intra-
community conflicts has puts breaks on 
development initiatives and economic and 
social change which would otherwise be of  
great benefit to the populations situated in 
the geographic periphery of  the country 
where these illegal armed protection agen-
cies are prominent.
This lifestyle spread which caused un-
precedented transformations in interme-
diate sized cities such as Pereira, Tuluá, 
Valledupar and Bucaramanga (where 
commanders and gangsters were given 
temporary refuge).  It also contributed 
to increased legalisation of  paramilitary 
activities that oiled the machinery of  their 
alternative form of  governance. The in-
formal economy and open-door boarder 
smuggling fused with legal production and 
economy to form a dominant symbiosis. 
Additionally, a mutually supporting system 
made up of  the legal and the mafioso had 
come to constitute a resourceful platform 
for those offering security. Furthermore, 
abandoned populations provided a fruit-
ful pool of  clientele to which protection 
agencies could provide their services. The 
choice between anarchy or protection 
agencies has not been considered by those 
who make decisions in government. Above 
all if  those affected count on additional 
resources coming from business with the 
same protection agencies 
IV.  Context and trajectory 
Analysing the Colombian conflict calls for 
a certain degree of  commitment on the 
part of  the researchers.  This occasion-
ally creating a danger for them: too much 
curiosity kills.  One persistent research 
problem is that when explaining the way 
that the para-state organisations operate, 
normally only inchoate information can be 
found.  However, with the consolidation of  
the nexus between national organisms and 
international institutions, more valuable 
information has been uncovered regard-
ing the mechanisms they employed.  The 
confessions of  the head drugs traffickers 
and evidence divulged in the prosecutions 
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against members of  criminal organisations 
in the trials lead by the attorney general 
also provide us with leads17. 
It is possible to work from information 
collected from official judicial reports of  
the paramilitary and drugs trafficking trials. 
The accused is rewarded with benefits for 
declaring their illegal activities, crimes and 
the massacres that they have participated 
in. These confessions are valuable for 
our analysis. Jorge 40, Mancuso, and Don 
Diego, all prosecuted in the United States 
under charges of  drugs trafficking, gave 
details in their confessions that paint a 
more complete picture of  their individual 
front’s activities and paramilitary strategy 
employed over the last few decades. 
Generally, the sources used in recent re-
search what are predominantly descriptive 
in character. However, in our case we have 
opted for using research initiated a decade 
ago, consisting in a referential mark based 
on argumentation theory, non-cooperative 
games and asymmetrical information. 
When argumentation techniques and 
17 Research problems regarding sources and quality of  information of  civil wars have presented a fun-
damental difficulty for various reasons: first, because an unbiast researcher will not have sufficient 
information to analyse the principal perpetrators.  Second, factual information is always discovered ex 
post, after the events have occurred; therefore, motives, causes and circumstances are reconstructed 
in accordance with the narrative and interests in hand. Thorough research always should consists in a 
scrupously diverse range of  sources and reliable testimonies. See: (Estrada, 2007a).
18 My investigative work undertaken between 1998-2004 concentrated on strategic aspects of  the armed 
conflict using argumentation logic. The results identified discursive structures of  a violent actor which 
were used to justify para-state acts.  Analytic instruments facilitated the study of  ideological differences 
and the process of  mutual learning adopted by both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. A relatively 
original aspect in the methodology which was employed was the relationship between the discourse, 
ideology and the armed conflict in Colombia. Please see in particular: “La retórica del paramilitarismo”, 
in Revista Análisis Político, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, IEPRI, 
Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia,  vol. 44, pp. 39-57, 2001; The book: Metáforas de una 
guerra perpetua, pragmática de la argumentación en el conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Editorial 
Universidad Eafit, Medellín, 2004, contains a good part of  this period of  investigation.
rational structures are used to explain 
violence, it is demonstrated that the para-
state organisations operated by forming 
coalitions in strategic territories for drugs 
production and trafficking. The aim of  this 
project is to advance research of  these new 
strands of  the conflict18.
An aspect of  the armed conflict which we 
focused our reserach on was the recon-
struction of  the phenomena of  rumors. 
Kowalski’s and Strojnowsk’s graphic 
models show that the location of  threat-
ened populations can be used to explain 
spacial ties between the armed actors and 
the expansion of  information (Estrada, 
2007ª).  Using their models, the network of  
information can be visualised as a natural, 
progressive and non-lineal expansion.  The 
information spreads through a sequence 
of  cuasal relationships and disperses in 
accordance with the force of  individual 
and collective beliefs in a particular social 
network. 
The relationship between information and 
snitching, prima facie, falls into the domain 
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of  rumours. Often people are quick to tell 
on their neighbours so as to obtain benefits 
or protection and security.  The accusations 
take on various forms, one of  these being 
rumour (“they say that”, “some people are 
saying”, “its been said that”). The character 
of  a rumour allows for little alterations or 
discrepancies to be made as it passes from 
ear to ear. The consequences, even on a 
global scale, can be regrettable. The ru-
mours are motivated by perverse collective 
and personal interests: first, the interests 
lie in the perks received by the informer; 
second, the interests relate to the strategy 
of  terror which is used to intimidate victims 
and those who are close to them.
The pieces of  information that correlate 
with rumour are not always collected within 
completely structured conditions. What 
does that mean? As such, certain pieces of  
potentially key information are chosen and 
related to strategic points of  the network 
that are in charge of  reproducing informa-
tion in adjacent areas. Así, un nodo que 
contiene potencialmente información clave 
puede relacionarse con puntos estratégicos 
en la red que se encargaría de reproducir la 
información en áreas adyacentes. Explain 
more. Out of  a collection of  known infor-
mation, keys pieces are chosen and related 
to one another so as to justify strategy.  The 
direction that the information takes is not 
linear but follows capricious diversions. 
In other words, rumors are formed by 
interactive relationships and have evident 
faults: gaps in information, distortion and 
cases of  individuals in a network behaving 
indifferently. This can be observed in the 
following diagram: 
Even more than investigating the relation-
ship between information and rumour 
affected by the armed conflict, the aim of  
our research was to discover the conceptual 
structures that underlie conflict discourse. 
Based on interviews and statements given 
by paramilitaries and insurgents (Carlos 
Castaño, Alfonso Cano, Comandante 
Gabino), reports and both printed and digi-
tal disclosed information, we were able to 
design cartography for the metaphors and 
analogies employed by the violent actors. 
The research made use of  Lakoff ’s (1999) 
Graphic 1
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and Facounnier’s theories with application 
to the Colombian context19.
V. Strategic correlations 
The research in this article has avoided be-
ing misguided down two common paths. 
First, there is a marked tendency to typify 
the actors as protagonists. The history of  
the self-defence forces and insurgents writ-
ten by journalists is generally speculative in 
kind, characterising the criminals as Robin 
Hood heroes. Second, the analysis of  para-
state business is prejudiced because it is 
considered in isolation, every group being 
judged within different strategic systems. 
It is illogical to explain operational mecha-
nisms outside of  their macro contexts and 
not consider the holistic structure of  the 
various organisations. These two aspects 
have received little attention, according 
[Hypothesis (4)].
19 Papers: Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “Metáforas del Poder Político”, El Estado y la Fuerza: v.1 fasc.1 
p. -, 2001; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “La información y el rumor en zonas de conflicto: estrategias por 
el poder local en la confrontación armada en Colombia”, Análisis Político v.- fasc. 60 p. 44-59, 2007; 
Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “Rumor e información. Estrategias por el poder local”, Revista Semana pp. 
22-24 ,2006; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “El Lenguaje de la Guerra y la Política en Colombia”, Reflexión 
Política, Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga, pp. 71-79, 2000; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “Discursos 
de una Guerra Perpetua”, Revista UIS Humanidades, v.31 fasc.2 p.-, 2002; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, 
“La Retórica del Paramilitarismo”, Análisis Político, v. 44 fasc. pp. 39-57, 2001; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, 
“Metáforas del Discurso Político en Colombia”, La Historia Contemporánea y las Ciencias Sociales, pp. 
198-220, 2004; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, Los nombres del Leviatán, Análisis de discursos de la Guerra 
en Colombia”, Revista Semana; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, Las metáforas de una guerra perpetua: análisis 
de la pragmática del discurso en el conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Universitario Editorial Eafit, 
v.1, 2004; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “Propagación del rumor y la información en las guerras civiles”: III 
Simposio Internacional sobre analice do discurso, Universidad Federal de Mina Gerais, p. 1-56, v. III, 2008.
20 Banks, C.M., Sokolowski, J.A., “From War on Drugs to War against Terrorism: Modeling the Evolution 
of  Colombia’s Counter-Insurgency”, Social Science Research, 2008. This article evaluates the phenome-
non of  political anti-insurgency in bilateral Colombian-US relations, discussing the changes that drugs 
trafficking and the war on terrorism have made on the identity of  the para-state groups. For an evaluation 
of  the coca eradication programmes and the intervention of  the actors of  the armed conflict please see: 
Joshua D. Angrist and Adriana D. Kugler, “Rural Winfall or a new resource curse? Coca, income and 
civil conflicto in Colombia”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol XC May 2008 number 2.   
During the initial stage of  the Uribe gov-
ernment, the reinsertion programme in 
which various paramilitary fronts partici-
pated (which is still presently being run) 
was accompanied by triumphal rhetoric 
concerning the dawning of  such criminal 
organisations. Many academics support 
Uribe's project to demobilize the irregu-
lar armies that have been the authors of  
numerous massacres over the last decade. 
Commissions of  what have been organised 
for various purposes: to obtain financial 
support and respect from the international 
community, to create a memory for the 
victims, to offer reinserted soldiers employ-
ment in business and industry. Also, there 
was a considerable amount of  media hype 
that covered the governmental paramilitary 
reinsertion project. A delirious degree of  
confident in the project has driven many 
to conclude that no armed conflict exists 
in Colombia [Hypothesis (1)]20.
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However, reality has had a different face 
than the ideology. Evidence shows that the 
paramilitaries have been restructured and 
the coalitions between the drugs cartels and 
the emerging groups who aim to occupy 
territories, control illegal businesses and 
traffic drugs within the illicit international 
markets have been renewed21. Novel forms 
of  competition have developed between 
the para-state groups, above all, amongst 
small combat units and the information 
systems that they use are designed to re-
locate rapidly when the enemy attacks.  By 
concentrating their laboratories in smaller 
localities, the protection agencies and 
groups of  drugs traffickers manage to keep 
the market reasonable stable22.
The expression of  the emerging groups has 
inherited the operatives that the insurgents 
and paramilitaries traditionally employ: 
threats of  the population, threatening 
the local governors, displacement of  the 
nucleus of  many local populations and 
assassination of  indigenous leaders and 
farmers. On top of  this, intelligence work 
and information are used to selection the 
target victims of  the group [Hypothesis 
(4)]. In the relocate strategy stage, the 
groups escalate the war in the predominate 
territory.  Even though the conduct of  the 
various groups is relatively insular, they 
21 The sustainment of  the illegal drugs market and smuggling has recently been documented, please see: 
Cajas, Juan, “Globalización del crimen, cultura y mercados ilegales”, Ide@s, Concyteg, Año 3, Núm. 36, 
5 de junio de 2008; and for research specifically regarding Colombia: Ocampo, José Antonio, Historia 
económica de Colombia, Bogotá, Planeta, 2007.
22 Mostly due to one of  the most powerful drugs cartels of  the last decade: the cartel of  the North Valley. 
The business of  this cartel extends to Mexico, Venezuela, the United State and Europe and its ope-
rations take on such forms as social cleaning in regions beyond that of  the Cauca Valley. Its activities 
were strategically supported by the paramilitaries and guerrillas, as described in: El cartel de los sapos, 
Bogotá, Editorial Planeta, 2008.
compete to offer security to those who 
can pay, and the rest of  the population is 
available for extortion and threat.     
As can be observed, a decreased intensity 
of  war coincides with the increased asym-
metry in relation to aggressive resources 
and to the defensives employed amongst 
the para-state groups. This makes sense, 
especially when the asymmetry is in the 
extreme, on the grounds that the groups 
represent only a small fraction of  the 
population and their possibility of  success 
in a military confrontation is abysmally 
low, with little probability that they take 
up arms.  In our case, we cannot measure 
the form of  total relationship i.e. when the 
combating front have equal force, it also 
may be the case that they are reluctant to 
initiate a high cost war when the prob-
ability of  beneficial results is hazy.  As the 
asymmetry grows, the strongest group may 
be tempted to act more oppressively and 
provoke a reaction. When evaluating the 
present stage of  the conflict, we observe 
a difference in the increased asymmetry, 
which reaches a higher peak in relation to 
paramilitary activity.
During this time the conflict has unfolded 
between paramilitaries groups not fully 
differentiated [Hypothesis (2), (4)]. Its 
territorial location techniques and their 
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means of  control are integrated into a 
process of  mutual learning. Its distance 
is not too pronounced. Between the lines 
intersect at the right end; angle reflection 
of  their actions is small. In other words, 
while the odds are much against the weaker 
group, the feasibility of  an outbreak of  
confrontation could be, ceteris paribus, 
higher among the security forces and 
the FARC or the ELN, which between 
government forces and groups emerging 
(paramilitary). Empirically this happened 
when a coalition of  paramilitary’s fronts 
found consistent with military objectives 
of  the security forces.
In many cases the ideological allegiances 
or financial incentives consistently acted in 
favor of  more resources towards combat-
ive. These could be kept temporarily. Each 
group provided normative conditions of  
recruitment, training areas, operational, 
wages and provisions, are fighting for 
exclusive loyalties especially when confron-
tation intensifies. In zones of  territorial 
influence populations experiencing fears of  
assimilation and annihilation on the other 
side and excluded induced empathy shared 
sensibilities and beliefs. In summary, it was 
reasonable during the high frequency of  
armed conflict to find expressions of  sup-
port group’s para-statal's. In regions such 
as the Serranía de San Lucas, Magdalena 
Medio and the Pacific Coast, the para-
militaries reached a “capital support” who 
managed to spread among the residents, 
and in times of  massacres led to the fronts 
and differentiate their businesses with more 
careful not to be confused with the identity 
of  the FARC or the ELN.
VI.  Evolution of  the conflict
Relate para-statal groups, (AUC, para-
militaries, insurgents, criminal organiza-
tions) with a specific period of  history 
in Colombia is common23. Conventional 
history, however, tend to cause violence 
originating in an uneven distribution of  
property, the feudal nature of  the link-
ages between farmers and landowners in 
the late nineteenth century. A clear social 
and economic inequality,, which would be 
extended considerably with the lack of  a 
solid political and institutional system. A 
distant ruling class was promoting extreme 
aggravation of  political fanaticism that 
would have bipartisan violence of  the 50s 
enduring one of  its expressions.
But if  the Colombian insurgents in its con-
frontation with the State are discursively 
heir to nineteenth-century wars, this trial 
did not have the same force in the case of  
irregular clusters, such as self-defense and 
paramilitary forces during the second half  
of  the twentieth century. These relate to a 
world determined by new values: consump-
tion, crime and demographic concentra-
tion of  urban poverty. As a mixture of  
23 León Gómez, Eduardo Pizarro, Una democracia asediada. Balance y perspectivas del conflicto armado 
en Colombia., Bogotá, Grupo Editorial Norma, 2004, pp. 370; Las FARC (1949-1965). From paramili-
taries: “the combination of  all forms of  struggle”, in collaboration with Ricardo Peñaranda Institute of  
Political Studies and International Relations at the National University. Tercer Mundo Editores, Bogotá, 
1991, Fals Borda, Orlando, Germán Guzmán, Eduardo Umaña Luna, The Colombia violence, Bogotá, 
Taurus, pp., 488.
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components that provides opportunities 
for those who can show more power to 
negotiate and offer protection in areas 
where land conflicts are being intensively 
[Hypothesis (2), (5)].
A fallacy promoted in the analysis suggests 
that the spiral of  conflict grew so aggres-
sive as the means employed. If  during the 
original violence of  mid-twentieth century, 
liberals and conservatives defended their 
beliefs by killing and topping, it is believed 
that after the 80s, vengeance and retalia-
tion deepened thanks to the sophisticated 
weaponry that was bought with drug funds 
[Hypothesis (5)]. This interpretation is 
partially correct. Then as now faced by 
those territories and populations, also are 
motivated by revenge, scams, and duels of  
honor. Generations of  violent actors who 
left us so-called violence to maintain their 
causes classical achieved within a context 
of  more complex claims and disputes.
However, as we have emphasized, the 
evolution of  abundant evidence against 
parastatal groups contrasts with few new 
developments in research models. The lit-
erature lacks empirical basis for effect and 
analytical relationships are weak. Several 
authors are more interested in spreading 
common places to relate their information 
sources [Hypothesis (1)].
VII.  Heuristics
In the context of  this nature is required 
to work on the subject with conceptual 
tools of  greater density. Academic re-
search on the phenomena described are 
supplemented in our perspective with the 
following components:
1. The idea of  explaining the war in Co-
lombia taking as basis the evolution 
and development of  private protec-
tion agencies has been linked to the 
progressive generation of  a potential 
market that starts with farmers and 
entrepreneurs in the Middle Magdalena 
and Puerto Boyaca, pervades the po-
litical geography of  the Pacific Coast, 
between smugglers and local politicians 
in border areas, the corridors of  Urabá 
from investments in oil palm cultiva-
tion, the departments of  the South: 
Caquetá and Putumayo, with vast fields 
of  coca, and extending into the areas 
north of  Valle, Cauca and Nariño, tri-
ggering retaliation violent organization 
with a tradition since the ‘60s24.
2. Our research on private security agen-
cies in emerging conflicts between their 
original sources is the work of  Robert 
Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974). The analytical merits of  the 
concept are related Nozick be fully 
24 See: (Estrada, 2007, Valencia, León, 2009; Kalmanovitz, 2001). Are not valued enough to have had the 
impact displacements stratification and population mobility. The social and economic costs of  these 
phenomena: Estrada, Fernando, Alberto Castillo, Gonzalez, Jorge Iván, La función Pública del Estado, 
Bogotá, DANE Departamento de Estadística, 2008, Alejandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y campesinos. 
El despojo de la tierra en Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2009.
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explained in the main components of  
private protection agencies in a market 
model25. Besides putting the strategic, 
conditions of  the agencies within the 
evolutionary process of  a political 
contract incomplete. The structure of  
competition for private protection in a 
society with irregular conflicts triggered 
an increasing spiral of  further violence 
by their actors. The work we do has 
made progress in a complementary 
direction26.
3. Another reference in the field of  stra-
tegic games and logical behavior in 
irregular conflicts have been the work 
of  Thomas Schelling: The Strategic of 
Conflict (1960) and Choise and Con-
secuence (1984). In both works we find 
ideas to understand the correlations 
between organized forms of  crime 
with informal forms of  the economy. 
A theory of  indirect communication 
25 The phenomenon is only beginning to be explored in Colombia on systematization of  national and 
international sources. With known as: CMSP, private military security companies. E, the topic of  private 
protection agencies a la Nozick came into full force in Colombia.
26 Papers of  the author: Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, “¿A dónde ir?  Un análisis del desplazamiento for-
zado”. Análisis Político Bogotá, Iepri, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, v. 65 pp. 146-151, 2009. 
“Guerra Civil y Contractualismo Político Incompleto”. Analítica Premium, 2008; “Estrategias por el 
poder local y conflicto Armado en Colombia”. Analítica Premium, pp. 17-25, 2007; “Estado Míni-
mo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial”, Revista Análisis Político, Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia, v.56, pp. 115-131, 2006; “El Escudo de Aquiles, Seguridad, Estado y Nuevas Guerras”, 
Revista Semana/Editorial Planeta, pp. 124-156, 2003; “El Soborno y la Amenaza en las Guerras 
Civiles”, Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Bogotá, Universidad De Los Andes, 2008; “Agencias de 
Protección y Poder Político Local”, Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Congreso de Ciencia Política 
Bogotá, Septiembre 30 - Octubre 4 de 2008; “Estrategia de Comunicación y Paramilitares en Colombia, 
Investigar la Comunicación Retos Científicos y Compromisos Sociales, 2007; “Concentración de Tie-
rras y Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia, Caso Antioquia”, Dinámica del Conflicto Armado en el 
contexto de la política de Seguridad Democrática, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2007; 
“Economía Política del Conflicto Armado en Colombia”, XXII Congreso Nacional de Estudiantes de 
Economía, Bucaramanga, 2007; Análisis Actualizado del Conflicto Armado en Colombia”, Mataron 
a Gaitán, Celebración 60 años, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional en Colombia, 2008. 
which plays a key role in cases such as 
threats and bribery. Successful coali-
tions between paramilitaries and drug 
cartels after 90, or links between smu-
gglers and dealers insurgency (FARC, 
ELN) reflect aspects of  organized 
crime on an original conflict between 
causal reasons.
4. Research by Diego Gambetta on the 
Sicilian Mafia (2003) analytical fra-
mework partially meets Schelling / 
Nozick within targets relevant to the 
investigation of  the Colombian case. 
We want to explore the direction taken 
by the work of  Gambetta basically the 
following: (a) the idea of  the protection 
industry as a potential markets, (b) 
provides comparative relationships 
between markets and market protec-
tion ordered disordered. The work we 
have elaborated on the information 
and rumor in conflict areas (Estrada, 
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2006), are complemented with the idea 
developed in the trademarks Gambetta 
and mechanisms of  communication 
and information used by criminal or-
ganizations.
A wide variety of  prejudice has gained 
ground among proponent’s comments 
on links between clusters paramilitary and 
drug cartels [hypothesis (3), (5)]. A widely 
accepted belief  is that the protection and 
security are marginal to the objectives of  
the armed conflict. This idea suggests a 
fragmented version of  illegal markets in 
which each business unit operates inde-
pendently of  the others. The boss in the 
chain of  the conflict only indirectly, since 
its objectives are focused on the delivery 
routes, money laundering or the business 
of  smuggling at the borders. However, 
relations between the posters with the 
paramilitaries or between the cartels and 
the guerrillas, as well as the relationships 
they have minor criminal organizations 
with links in the chain, they agree on 
many goals27.
In Gambetta (2003) the case of  the Sicilian 
Mafia that private protection is a “central 
activity of  a well-ordered mob. Those 
who receive protection may be fussy, but 
not usually considered useless, and many 
more times than you think in general, 
are actively seeking”. This observation in 
the Colombian case is given the apparent 
27 This hypothesis of  correlations and shared interests between the paramilitary’s groups and State Robert 
Nozick expresses originality in works reviewed (Nozick, 1974). While it is important to note that the 
case studies, as in Colombia, offering obvious limitations. The change in policy or strategic positions 
taken by key actors, betrayal, money laundering, concealment of  information, makes the trajectory of  
research in an open challenge to solve several problems: how to keep the illegal drug trade with agen-
cies different?, Who assure safety on the routes of  transmission of  drugs?, how corrupt institutional 
representatives both within and outside the frontiers?, When coalitions are required and with whom?
objections lawlessness among emerging 
groups, but some disorder in the form of  
business does not mean that the ways in 
which security operates a business does 
not represent high profitability. In fact it 
is possible to verify how the conflict with 
struggles over the monopoly of  illegal 
businesses in municipalities and regions.
The reason's for this confusion is related to 
studies that focus on aspects of  the prob-
lem prone to spectacular. The categories 
and core concepts to define the conflict 
still within a sphere comprised of  plati-
tudes. We need to go far enough with less 
journalistic study structures. Another bias 
underlines the absence of  armed conflict; 
some analysts invoke magic solution to this 
formula. “Organized Crime”, “emerging 
bands”, “guerrillas” or “paramilitaries” are 
used as denominators to describe in many 
cases the same thing. The basic problem is 
complicated by the difficult nature found 
in the sources. A variety of  reason´s in 
the Colombian case requires a restructur-
ing and work on materials that have been 
“kicked by the angels” (John L. Austin, 
Philosopher).
There is first the need for a separate 
conceptual framework for agents, orga-
nizations, cartels, suppliers and buyers of  
protection. And recognize that in half  a 
century of  shared activities, paramilitary 
groups have managed to bring an illegal 
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market has its own dynamics among large 
investors. How have they affected the 
regional circuits of  the illegal market of  
the customs protection of  each region 
in Colombia: mayors, city councils, legal 
trade? A proper understanding of  these 
differences also reflects a fundamental is-
sue of  political economy: how they have 
incorporated the private protection and 
illegal markets to the general structure of  
formal economy in Colombia [Problems 
controvert the assumptions (1), (2), (3), (5)].
VIII. Territorial expansion
This unit is close to problems of  work 
within Garfinkel / Skaperdas (2007) in 
the sense of  exploring how disputes aris-
ing from civil wars are related to defec-
tive forms of  competition for economic 
resources. More specifically, the analysis 
made in the context of  civil wars show a 
marked tendency to the formation of  scale 
underlying business operating on property 
rights and an expanded private protec-
tion. The authors call this phenomenon: 
technologies of  conflict. Our objective is 
similar to the extent that we also investigate 
the effects of  the illegal market of  private 
protection on income: the decisive aspects 
in the distribution of  the local mafia powers 
or modes how a group relates paramilitary 
defects with marginal productivity in areas 
that remain in dispute. In other words it 
means asking how the protection operates 
in the informal markets depending on the 
intensity of  competition and demand to 
the citizens for greater security.
The analytical framework Garfinkel / 
Skaperdas, has served us well to observe 
the mechanisms of  adaptability and change 
with the clusters within a given territorial 
area. What elements of  economic behav-
ior prevalent among combat units: the 
commanders and regular soldiers. What 
incentives for capital accumulation and 
how specific influences may have illegal 
markets between those who determine 
market decisions. The role of  governors 
and the sharing of  political powers are 
dangerous. The distribution of  resources 
in areas under pressure from paramilitaries 
and insurgents is akin to a hobbesian war28.
Recent research on dynamic changes of  
the armed conflict in Colombia has an 
extensive list of  problems: How much 
has changed from political geography 
and territorial reintegration and delivery 
of  paramilitary fronts?: “In the hands of  
those who have been protected areas and 
regions and exploited by the FARC and the 
ELN during the Uribe government? How 
has recovered the State territorial presence 
28 The amount of  challenges is broad and works tend to specialize. Research on specific problems: Castillo, 
María del Pilar, “La decisión de desplazarse: un modelo teórico a partir de un estudio de caso”, Bogotá, 
Revista Análisis Político 65, Enero/Abril de 2009, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Inter-
nacionales, IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, pp. 33-52. In the same review: Hoyos, Gómez, 
Diana, “Dinámicas político-electorales en zonas de influencia paramilitar. Análisis de la competencia 
y la participación electoral”, pp. 13-32. Isaza José Fernando & Campos Diógenes, “Consideraciones 
cuantitativas sobre la evolución reciente del conflicto”, pp. 3-12; Mejía Daniel, “The War Against Drug 
Producers”, with H. Grossman, NBER Working Paper # 11141, February 2005; “Capital Destruc-
tion, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth”, with C.E. Posada, Borradores de Economía, No. 257 
(working paper), Banco de la República.
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in region to compete until recently by para-
military and guerrilla? What is this presence 
of  the State itself  and what government 
policies in regions like the Pacific and the 
Urabá Chocó?
These questions require a look at differ-
ent economic and social geography as 
well as an analysis of  strategies that cor-
relate between paramilitary movements 
(black eagles, countries, and stubble), drug 
cartels and guerrilla fronts. Proceed with 
an auxiliary hypothesis in our approach: 
the FARC military crossroads during the 
Uribe administration and the rehabilita-
tion program of  the paramilitaries has 
not meant the final stage of  the conflict, 
but rather we sustain that such conditions 
have forced officials to change violent their 
operational plans and find coalitions to 
maintain its dominance and local political 
power, [contrary to Hypothesis (1), (2)].
In several recent research findings pro-
tection agencies are presented as unitary 
actors, strategies and objectives homoge-
neous territorial control unit and organiza-
tional unit. Nothing could be farther from 
reality. Because parastatal groups, especially 
during the Uribe administration have been 
forced to make internal adjustments in their 
foreheads, movements between middle 
and top (paramilitaries, FARC, ELN) and 
military coalitions in large regions of  the 
country [Contrary to Hypothesis (5) ]. 
The strategic dynamics tend to differenti-
ate their identities. New denominators 
semantic (black eagles) are combined with 
lessons learned in the field of  conflict. 
At the same time, those affected in areas 
under parastatal control mechanisms seek 
to protect their interests and properties. 
Within this scheme of  territorial projec-
tions, ranchers, businessmen, landowners 
and merchants seek again to reduce their 
transaction costs. The safety and secu-
rity goods returned as attractive between 
paramilitaries and insurgents. Throughout 
the past century has informally evolved a 
system of  interconnection between para-
militaries and insurgents seeking to replace 
the strength and legitimacy of  the state. So 
the interests (assets, properties, businesses, 
families) and the funds paid are not charged 
individually. Those working the supply 
side know what they do: associate with 
each other, guerrillas and paramilitaries, 
organized criminals and kidnappers, have 
entered into close relations key strategic 
areas of  regional geography. On rare oc-
casions the division of  labor depends on 
specialties ranging from street robbery 
to the slaughter, through kidnapping and 
extortion. 
It is likely that such a situation the individual 
incentives as a result of  complete frag-
mentation affecting collective action. And 
the rewards of  government campaign to 
gradually weaken the FARC. The individual 
reattachment act positively on the operating 
balance of  forces although official figures 
for experts are exaggerated (Isaza 2009). The 
central questions revolve around budgets 
less encouraging: rearrangement insurgency, 
territorial division and negotiations between 
political actors and commanders; escalation 
of  conflict in ascending sequence: intimida-
tion, extortion, threats, and selective killings. 
One of  the key issues in this scenario: how 
intra organizational balances established 
and local resource competitions between 
parastatal groups now replace paramilitaries 
and insurgents? 
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Research in the context of  international 
civil wars may be promising to better ob-
serve our case. The relationship between 
clusters and semi-internal relations among 
members of  an organization, as well as 
its geographic expansion and strategic, 
is central to understanding the trends of  
territorial conflict in Colombia. So part 
of  our next goal is to make a partial as-
sessment of  these specific problems in 
the Colombian context. We’ll see if  the 
dynamics that determine changes locally 
specific aspects shared with other regions 
in the world.
IX.  Emerging bands 
The political disintegration of  clusters 
paramilitaries is one of  the most difficult 
to address. Should we say des-ideological? 
Take up arms against the state “? Or use 
the State to “fight those who oppose the 
State? This double movement triggers a 
misleading way of  posing the problem. 
If  politics is lost in the conflict, what 
are the reasons? It was argued by many 
analysts is that the drug trade and drug 
trafficking explain everything [Hypothesis 
(5)]. Again, this means putting everything 
in one basket. 
And is it not so? The social have worked 
with differences? Mono-causal question 
is as flawed as its response, ceteris pari-
bus, explanations that place within the 
same level: strategies, objectives, policy, 
armament. The need to differentiate and 
develop a reclassification (by regions, ter-
ritories, incentives, resources and power), 
is essential. The changes provided in 
locations such as Puerto Boyacá Puerto 
Triunfo and after the paramilitary reinte-
gration program are sufficient to under-
stand that we were wrong to simplify the 
conflict and its resolution. 
Is it the rearmament of  paramilitary? 
Pure drugs business? Who are their lead-
ers less “spectacular”? Who pays? What 
area of  political / military project? Ques-
tions whose require question's of  critical 
geography and logical extension in the 
localities. The explanations are divided 
between those positions in emerging 
bands fragmented expression of  common 
crime and organized crime, or who were 
concerned to rearm and consolidate in 
former territories of  the paramilitaries. 
The picture is cloudy. The truth, however, 
is that the actions of  urban crime in border 
towns and illegal businesses, they reveal a 
strategic expansion whose geography has 
not been studied yet. 
Part of  conventional geography has been 
used in order to divert attention from criti-
cal areas of  conflict. Exploit the fears and 
hostility feeds. Depending on the source 
providing the information is abused map-
ping to develop interpretations. A map is 
presented as reality; however, the maps are 
not reality. It is possible that further studies 
of  critical geography teach us, by example, 
not only in what regions or areas of  the 
country there is expansion of  emerging 
bands, but to contribute to better define 
the dynamics of  transition and learning the 
paramilitaries groups. If  paramilitary gangs 
are emerging should be able to expose 
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what updates or changes its projections 
territorial behavior and strategic29.
The disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of  the paramilitaries, 
have you failed? Being negative response, 
what explains the return of  member’s com-
batants to areas that were predominantly 
paramilitary? There are many concerns 
expressed serious institutional difficulties 
to handle a problem of  dimensions that 
transcend the boundaries of  government. 
However, in the Colombian case, the gaps 
in the program seem to respond to original 
conceptions of  the process with severe 
limitations. Veterans do not surrender all 
their weapons. Businessmen, traders and, in 
general, economic sectors gave no support 
to the expectations of  employment and 
occupation. And gradually the incentives 
of  the program have been giving their way 
to new demands and proposals on the pro-
tection market. The negative influence of  
these factors, coupled with retaliation and 
crimes of  ex-playing elements that deserve 
consideration [argument to be against the 
hypothesis (1)]. 
29 A test that evaluates in an international context the emerging gang problem: Hoffman, Michael H., 
“Emerging combatants, war crimes and the Future of  international humanitarian law”, Crime, Law & 
Social Change 34: 99-110, 2000. The reflections are concerned with the need to distinguish combat-
ants and to degrade and paramilitaries groups and design problems arising from limited categories of  
international humanitarian law.
30 Cubides, Fernando: Burocracias armadas, Bogotá, Norma, 2006. The rhetorical force that had insuf-
ficient paramilitary commanders (Carlos Castaño, Salvatore Mancuso and Jorge 40) to demonstrate the 
ideological program was offset by the academic services provided by some Argentines and Colombians. 
Cubides carried elements related to the analysis of  this phenomenon.
31 León Valencia, Op. Cit.;  Alejandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y campesinos. El despojo de la tierra en 
Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2009.
If  government policy is to confuse emerg-
ing drug gangs, there are reasons to test 
their hypotheses. The emerging bands, it 
is claimed, do not have a counter-ideology 
that separates the paramilitaries. The 
paramilitary groups that were formed and 
evolved from Puerto Boyacá during the 
‘80s, until the fronts of  the Calima Bloc, 
dominant in the Pacific region, “were 
organized around a program counter? It 
is not clear. First, because their structures 
are not preserved uniformity of  command 
(each front emerged and responded to 
specific demands of  those who financed 
their creation). Second, its members did 
not share resources from a single supplier. 
Third, their statements and not ideologi-
cally conceived. The “paramilitary ideol-
ogy” was really more an artifact30.
Some works have explored the relation-
ship between paramilitary groups and 
regional powers31. Documentation found 
in computer files and papers (bills, notes 
or receipts book) makes a clear influence 
on contracting mechanisms, and resource 
transfers and municipal departments. 
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Injected capital flows to regional econo-
mies by drug traffickers were protected by 
the warlords32.
X. Conclusions
Far from being ordered in accordance with 
strategic plans of  a single organization, 
emerging bands have become increasingly 
common, despite the hostility caused by the 
Uribe administration and the propaganda 
against [Hypothesis (1), (5)] has proved 
devastatingly effective. The ideology that 
mobilizes its actions in regions such as 
Córdoba, Cauca, Valle, Nariño and La 
Guajira, not politics, not even be described 
as a counterinsurgency strategy, but rather 
a specific narrative of  unmet basic needs. 
It is possible to believe that in conditions 
of  desperate unemployment, for example, 
will become an effective policy33.
This interpretation of  suffering violence 
will shake if  focuses on a guilty (the State) 
which in turn can isolate the causes of  
violence casually addressing the problem. 
These narrative units are offered as a means 
of  justifying causes quite far from their 
origins. The emerging bands, paramilitary, 
guerrilla and criminal organizations have 
enough speech in favor of  its strategic 
objectives. If  suffering is seen as natural 
32 López, López, Andrés, El cartel de los sapos, la historia secreta de las mafias del narcotráfico más 
poderosas del mundo: el cartel del norte del valle, Bogotá, Planeta, 2008.
33 In the words of  the same drug traffickers this seems like a fable, but they are common components 
of  speaking about the reasons given by some groups to join paramilitary: “As the people remain child 
poverty, corruption, unemployment, lack of  opportunity and is in the drug’s only chance of  escaping 
poverty, the tentacles of  crime and drug contagion bacteria without remedy, “ibid., p. 311. As heroes, 
drug traffickers are presented in television series and media publishers. This is the case of  Andrés López 
whose book: El cartel de los sapos, Bogotá, Norma, 2008, as a libretto adapted for television, has just 
won an honorable prize India Catalina in Cartagena, Colombia.
or without cause shall be considered a 
misfortune instead of  injustice and produce 
resignation rather than rebellion. There-
fore, mafia, guerrillas or paramilitaries 
claimed its causes in speeches that seek to 
prosecute, rather than assuming the status 
of  perpetrators. 
It happened with the FARC from its origins 
in Marquetalia, with the AUC of  Magdalena 
Medio, with the MAS (Death to Kidnap-
pers), with the paramilitaries in Cordoba 
and Antioquia Urabá, with paramilitaries 
under Ramon Isaza and the Black Eagles 
under the command of  Don Mario, every 
one of  the main actors of  the conflict is 
delivered to a discourse of  guilt. Interpret 
the actions of  their enemies as crimes, 
inserting an all-encompassing discourse 
on monstrosity of  his actions. Outreach 
campaigns and territorial dominance, 
population displacement and destruction 
in the regions should be observed also by 
creating a myth that will help sustain the 
conspiracy. 
Demonizing its enemies and responsible 
for the atrocities of  the war not only helped 
to neutralize the scruples to kill peasants 
and Indians ( “guerrillas dressed in civilian 
clothes,” said Jorge 40 and Carlos Castaño). 
He allegedly also helped intensify recruit-
ment for their cause. If  the regions where 
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groups did not operate in a limited way-or-
with a legitimate presence of  state agencies, 
the opportunity was unique to invoke the 
need for his presence, and the discipline 
imposed on populations. The enemy was 
seen as a destroyer of  peaceful coexistence, 
the state as indifferent and insulated to the 
center. This was the condensation of  their 
ideology. But the causes alleged hidden 
interest in the discourse of  higher crime 
and criminal scope. 
The ideology had abdicated her political 
identity. Shares of  emerging bands seem 
to be defined instrumentally by the drug 
economy and the dominance of  strategic 
geography. The recruitment of  youth and 
adolescents preferably made in depressed 
areas of  Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Bucara-
manga and Barranquilla, basically show 
that the conviction is not doctrinaire. For 
some emerging rescue their unemploy-
ment and poverty, incorporating the main 
workforce at little risk. We have passed 
since the violence of  the 60s classic, low 
imperatives disguised by the discourse of  
the Cold War, into a product of  the first 
decade of  the century, where conflicts of  
interest between groups paramilitaries, 
is reduced to the drug markets and drug 
trafficking [hypothesis (5)]. 
What we sought in this review of  research 
on the conflict in Colombia is to hire our 
work with some of  the assumptions most 
influential among the public. In no way 
were completed articles or books released 
in the last decade, nor in his fullness we 
have examined the authors dealing with 
conflict. The hypothesis we have proposed 
as predominant versions, have been out-
lined leaving out details that do not affect 
the whole. In the introduction we said that 
these are not caricatures, but strongly held 
belief  among those who put their theories 
about the Colombian conflict.
We show, contrary to the hypothesis (1), 
which indeed we have reason to be wary 
of  rumors about the end of  armed conflict 
and the final dismantling of  paramilitary 
groups. The facts of  war are striking and 
show us that the FARC, though dimin-
ished in their action, remain structurally 
intact. And the paramilitaries were able 
to sell at a relatively low price the idea of  
reintegration, in fact, maintained camps 
Vicente Castaño and rear with new heads 
of  emerging bands (Don Mario, stubble). 
The armed conflict in Colombia has taken 
on new faces, like Clausewitz’s metaphor 
An explanation of  the armed conflict [Hy-
pothesis (2), (3)] has been complemented 
in our approach from a theory of  the 
Schelling strategy / Nozick. We believe that 
addressing the conflict from the strategies 
and territorial geography promises less 
simple observations. New wars do not 
necessarily mean radical breaks with the 
strategy of  violent actors of  the 60s, but no 
doubt that incorporate aspects such as drug 
trafficking and smuggling, are variables 
whose explanation is more complex. Game 
theory and asymmetric information and 
discourse analysis contribute substantially 
to improved research methods. 
There are sufficient aspects of  analogy. 
Analyst in the strategy and operations of  
guerrillas and paramilitaries, have suggested 
that the Colombian conflict analysis should 
show the differences between clusters 
paramilitary. Not only because after the 
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80s, drug trafficking has played a decisive 
role, but because the geography of  terri-
tories and control combinations have not 
been studied sufficiently. Geography of  
armed conflict should also provide tools 
to understand the impact of  war on natural 
resources, for example. Our approach is 
complementary to the hypothesis (4) of  
the introduction. 
Finally, we sustain that while the drug 
economy has filtered the structure of  
semi-groups, promoting market competi-
tion and private security protection, drug 
trafficking does not explain absolutely 
all sources of  violence in Colombia. The 
strategy of  armed conflict has its main 
actors incentives are deeply rooted in 
unequal economic relations. There differ-
ences between regions in the center and 
the periphery of  the Colombia and asym-
metrical forms of  development, poverty, 
unemployment and corruption. These are 
variables in which the drug is not directly 
involved but are part of  historical attitudes 
that require our analysis.
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